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ABSTRACT
This paper introduces model uncertainty into the empirical study of the
determinants of terrorism at country level. This is done by adopting a
Bayesian model averaging approach and accounting for the over-dis-
persed count data nature of terrorist attacks. Both a broad measure of
terrorism and incidents per capita have been analyzed. Our results
suggest that, among the set of regressors considered, those reflecting
labor market conditions and economic prospects tend to receive high
posterior inclusion probabilities. These findings are robust to changes in
the model specification and sample composition and are not meaning-
fully affected by the generalized linear regression model applied.
Evidence of a geographically heterogeneous relationship between ter-
rorism and its determinants is also provided.
Abbreviation: BMA- Bayesian Model Averaging; GLM- Generalized Linear
Models
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Motivation
There has been an upsurge in the empirical analysis of the socioeconomic determinants of
terrorism at country level after the 9/11 attacks. Related studies explore alternative information
sources and dimensions of terrorist activity, consider different potential determinants of terrorism
and sample periods, and apply a wide array of estimation methods. This implies that, although it is
important to unveil the main causes of terrorism to deal with this scourge and mitigate its
substantial and multidimensional costs, there is no clear consensus on the origins of terror in the
literature. As an example, Krieger and Meierrieks (2011) provide an overview and critical discussion
of the early evidence about the sources and targets of transnational terrorism, reaching no
conclusive results.
A theoretical foundation for the hypothesis that economic grievances generate terrorism, based
on the rational-choice theory and without dismissing noneconomic factors, can be found in
Meierrieks (2014). This author suggests that the lack of empirical consensus on the causes of
terrorism has to do with its heterogeneity and that its link with the economy needs to be further
investigated. Morris and LaFree (2016) also review the quantitative studies about country-level
correlates of terrorism, with an emphasis on economic, political and demographic variables. These
authors highlight the significant influence exerted by economic development and inequality,
democracy, failed states and physical integrity rights. In a related work, Kis-Katos, Liebert, and
Schulze (2011) find that the roots of domestic and transnational terrorism are similar. In particular,
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they show that failed and weak states1 are a breeding ground for terrorism, but do not support the
hypothesis that economic deprivation promotes terrorism. These results are relatively stable to
changes in the sample period analyzed. Freytag et al. (2011) develop a theoretical framework to
show that poor socioeconomic conditions may result in terrorism through opportunity costs,
providing empirical evidence of this relationship in both domestic and international incidents.
Gassebner and Luechinger (2011) implement an extreme bounds analysis (EBA, see Leamer
1983; Leamer and Leonard 1983) to identify the variables with a robust relationship with the
number of incidents in a given country. These authors find that, among the possible determinants
of terrorism included, those with a negative influence are economic freedom, physical integrity
rights, law and order and infant mortality rates. The variables positively related to terrorism are
population, urbanization, religious and ethnic tensions, military expenditure and personnel, wars,
strikes, government fractionalization, foreign portfolio investments, OECD membership and poli-
tical proximity to the United States. The main conclusion that can be drawn from this study is that,
although there are some robust correlates of terrorism, the majority of the variables suggested in
the literature are not supported by the EBA.
Motivated by the lack of consensus on the determinants of terrorism at country level, we
contribute to this literature by introducing model uncertainty into this context through a
Bayesian model averaging2 (BMA) approach (Raftery 1995; Raftery, Madigan, and Hoeting 1997).
By proceeding in this way, we are able to simultaneously deal with model selection, estimation and
inference. In a nutshell, BMA assigns a prior probability to a set of models and updates it according
to the data. The posterior model probabilities are later averaged and used to construct posterior
inclusion probabilities (PIP) for the candidate regressors. Our empirical analysis controls for the
over-dispersed count data nature of the information about terrorist incidents by implementing the
BMA in a generalized linear model (GLM) framework (McCullagh and Nelder 1989; Nelder, Robert,
and Wedderburn 1972). A broad terror measure (Freytag et al. 2011) is being used, together with
the common distinction between domestic and transnational attacks. By abstracting from this
widely applied dichotomy, we try to capture the phenomenon of terrorism in a country as a whole.
Nonetheless, as Mueller (2016) points out, the study of absolute counts referring to countries with
very different sizes may be problematic. In addition, individual welfare is more likely to be affected
by terrorism measured in per capita terms (Jetter and Stadelmann 2017). For these reasons,
terrorist incidents have also been considered in relative terms to population in the present study.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the data sources and the
variables included in the analysis. Section 3 presents the empirical strategy adopted, explaining the
GLMs that deal with over-dispersed count data and BMA techniques. Section 4 shows the main
results and checks of their robustness. Finally, Section 5 concludes, establishes policy recommen-
dations and proposes avenues for future research.
Data Sources and Variables
The information about terrorist attacks has been extracted from the Global Terrorism Database
(GTD), maintained by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to
Terrorism (START,3 see LaFree and Dugan 2007), which includes data regarding incidents world-
wide since 1970 (except 1993, due to issues with that year). The GTD defines terrorism as ‘the
threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by non-state actors to attain a political,
economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation’. Using the available
information about the date and the location of each terrorist event, the number of attacks has
been aggregated at the country level on a yearly basis. Apart from this general measure of terror,
the incidents have also been distinguished by their domestic or international character.
In the present paper, we are following Krieger and Meierrieks (2011), who identified broad
theoretical families linking terrorism with socioeconomic, political and demographic factors. The
source for these potential determinants of terrorism, included with a temporal lag to mitigate
2 M. SANSO-NAVARRO AND M. VERA-CABELLO
possible reverse causality concerns, is the World Development Indicators (The World Bank 2017).
Due to the lack of data on some variables, our sample is made up of 130 countries and covers the
period 1990–2014 (see Appendix A for more details). A description of the whole set of regressors
considered in the empirical analysis can be found in Table 1.
A first group of variables reflecting economic conditions and development is made up of real GDP
per capita, the annual rate of real GDP growth, the unemployment and inflation rates, household and
government final consumption expenditure and gross fixed capital formation. Further, there is a
preconceived idea that globalization alters existing structures and provides new opportunities for
alienated people. This hypothesis would imply that other things being equal, open countries will be
less prone to terrorist attacks. For this reason, the sum of exports and imports as a percentage of GDP
has been included as an explanatory variable. Exports of primary goods and fuel try to capture that, as
in other forms of violence, terrorism may be related to the abundance of natural resources. Inflows of
foreign direct investment, transfers from abroad and official development assistance and aid received
have also been considered as potential determinants of terrorism.
A greater number of targets, victims and perpetrators can be found in large countries. Therefore,
total population4 and population density have been introduced into our set of candidates to
explain terrorism. Urban population has been included because there is a consensus in the related
literature that urbanization is conducive to terrorism. Other variables studied are life expectancy,
female labor force participation and primary and secondary school enrollment rates. It has also
been taken into account that terrorism is commonly used by the weaker contender in an asym-
metric armed conflict. This has been proxied by the personnel in the armed forces and military
expenditure. In this regard, it is worth noting that defence spending may also reflect counter-
terrorism efforts and their effectiveness.
Table 1. Potential socioeconomic determinants of terrorism: Description of variables.
Variable Description
lngdppc GDP per capita; constant 2011 international $; PPP; in natural logarithms
Growth GDP growth; market prices; constant local currency; annual; per cent
Unempl Unemployment; national/ILO estimates; as percentage of labor force
Inflation GDP implicit deflator growth rate; annual; per cent
Consumhh Household final consumption expenditure; as percentage of GDP
gfcf Gross fixed capital formation; as percentage of GDP
Govexp General government final consumption expenditure; as percentage of GDP
Openness Trade (exports plus imports); as percentage of GDP
Primaryx Exports of agricultural raw materials, food, ores and metals; as percentage of merchandise exports
Fuelx Fuel exports; as percentage of merchandise exports
fdi Foreign direct investment; net inflows; as percentage of GDP
Transfers Net current transfers from abroad; current US$; as percentage of GDP
Aid Net official development assistance and official aid received; current US$; as percentage of GDP
Lnpopul Total population; in natural logarithms
Popdens Population density; people per square kilometer of land area
Urban Urban population; as percentage of total population
Lifexp Life expectancy at birth; in years
Female Female labor force participation rate; modeled ILO estimate; as percentage of female population aged
over 15
Primary Primary school enrollment rate; gross; in per cent
Secondary Secondary school enrollment rate; gross; in per cent
Armedf Armed forces personnel; as percentage of total labor force
Milexp Military expenditure; as percentage of GDP
Note: Data source is the World Development Indicators (The World Bank 2017). The sample period covers the years from 1990
to 2014.
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Empirical Strategy
GLMs for Count Data
As has already been well established in the related literature, the number of terrorist attacks is a count
variable with a variance larger than its mean. The reason is that, while there are a non-negligible
number of countries which have not experienced a terrorist incident in a given year, there are others
that have suffered a large number of attacks. In order to obtain correct inferences, this data feature
needs to be controlled for by the estimation technique applied to study the socioeconomic determi-
nants of terrorism. Over-dispersed count data have traditionally been analyzed using quasi-Poisson and
negative binomial regressions, which belong to the family of GLMs.
Broadly speaking, GLMs consider that a variable y depends on a vector of regressors x in such a
way that the conditional distribution of y, given x, is a linear exponential family with probability
density function (PDF):
fðy; λ;ϕÞ ¼ exp
yλ$ bðλÞ
ϕ
þ cðy;ϕÞ
! "
(1)
where λ is a canonical parameter that depends on the regressors and ϕ denotes the dispersion
parameter. The functions bð&Þ and cð&Þ are determined by the member of the GLM family being
used. The conditional mean and variance of yi are:
EðyijxiÞ ¼ μi ¼ b
0ðλiÞ (2)
VarðyijxiÞ ¼ ϕb
00ðλiÞ (3)
with i ¼ 1; :::; n, where n denotes the number of observations. b0ð&Þ and b00ð&Þ are, respectively, the
first and second derivatives of bð&Þ. Therefore, up to the dispersion parameter, the distribution of yi
is determined by its mean, its variance being proportional to VarðμÞ ¼ b00½λðμÞ*.
The dependence of the conditional mean (2) on the regressors is established through a link
function gð&Þ and a set of parameters β, usually estimated through maximum likelihood and the
iterative weighted least squares algorithm:
gðμiÞ ¼ xi
0β (4)
For estimation purposes, and rather than focusing on the likelihood (1), it is more suitable to
consider the regression model for the mean (4), where the functions used to fit the model are
family-dependent (Zeileis, Kleiber, and Jackman 2008). The Poisson distribution is the benchmark
for count data in the same way as the normal distribution is for continuous data (McCullagh and
Nelder 1989). Its PDF is given by:
fðy; μÞ ¼
expð$μÞμy
y!
(5)
The Poisson regression model assumes a logarithmic link function (gðμÞ ¼ logðμÞ), implying a log-
linear relationship between the mean and the linear predictor. The dispersion parameter is set to
one, the variance being equal to the mean (VarðμÞ ¼ μ). This is equivalent to saying that this model
is not adequate for over-dispersed data. However, the quasi-Poisson regression model, which
leaves the dispersion parameter unrestricted and estimates it from the data, is suitable. Although
its coefficients coincide with those obtained by the Poisson model, inferences are adjusted for
over-dispersion.
An alternative manner for dealing with over-dispersed count data is the negative binomial
regression model. In this case, the conditional distribution of y is a gamma mixture of Poisson
distributions, whose PDF can be parametrized as:
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fðy; μ; θÞ ¼
Γðy þ θÞ
ΓðθÞy!
μyθθ
ðμþ θÞðyþθÞ
(6)
where Γð&Þ is the gamma function and θ denotes the shape parameter. The dispersion parameter
has been set to one and the variance function is given by VarðμÞ ¼ μþ μ
2
θ
. For a fixed value of the
shape parameter, expression (6) is a special case of the GLM framework.5 If θ has to be estimated,
this is done jointly with β through an iterative procedure.
BMA
In a closely related paper to the present one, Gassebner and Luechinger (2011) implement an EBA
to country-level data starting in 1980 to identify robust determinants of terrorism among a set of
65 regressors. These authors extract information about terrorist activity from three databases
(ITERATE, GTD and MIPT) and focus on three dimensions of terrorism: location of the attack, target
and perpetrator. The most surprising conclusion drawn from this study is that the majority of the
variables previously suggested in the literature as terrorism determinants were not supported by
their results.
This finding may be related to the main idea behind EBA, which explores whether the significance
of a given variable is not altered by using alternative combinations of a large set of regressors. This is
done by obtaining both a lower and an upper bound for the estimated coefficients and checking
whether zero lies within them. Although Brock and Durlauf (2001) consider EBA to be useful in
indicating the uncertainty regarding model specification, they acknowledge that this methodology
might not be efficient in searching for the correct model specification due to collinearity problems.
Rockey and Temple (2016) also point out that EBA may assess the significance of the regressors on the
basis of flawed specifications or models with low explanatory power. Moreover, a policy-maker should
be more interested in a probability distribution for the parameters associated with the variables under
scrutiny than on their statistical significance.
Model averaging techniques – available both in frequentist and Bayesian contexts – consist of
estimating all candidate models and then computing a weighted average of their estimates, taking
into account the implicit uncertainty conditional on a given model and across different models.
Following the initial work of Raftery (1995) and Raftery, Madigan, and Hoeting (1997), we adopt a
Bayesian approach to model averaging. In general, BMA assigns a prior probability to a set of
models and updates it according to the data at hand. The posterior model probabilities are
averaged later and used to construct PIP for the candidate regressors. Therefore, BMA is able to
deal simultaneously with model selection, estimation and inference.
Uncertainty in a GLM regression framework is related to the choice of the regressors to include
in x (Moral-Benito 2015). More specifically, there are 2q models (sets of regressors) to be estimated
Mj, j ¼ 1; :::; 2
q; each of them depending on a set of parameters βj with a conditional posterior
probability given by:
gðβjjy;MjÞ ¼
fðy βj;MjÞgðβ
j
## ##MjÞ
fðyjMjÞ
(7)
where fðyjβj;MjÞ and gðβ
jjMjÞ denote the likelihood function and the prior, respectively.
For a given prior model probability PðMjÞ, its posterior probability can be calculated applying
Bayes’ rule:
PðMjjyÞ ¼
fðyjMjÞPðMjÞ
fðyÞ
(8)
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Expressions (7) and (8) show that it is necessary to specify priors for both model parameters and
probabilities. Leamer (1978) proposed assuming that β is a function of βj to obtain the posterior
density function of the parameters for all the possible models using the law of total probability:
gðβjyÞ ¼
X2q
j¼1
PðMj yÞgðβj jy;MjÞ (9)
A common approach to further analyze point estimates and their variances is to take expectations
in (9) to obtain their posterior mean and variance:
EðβjyÞ ¼
X2q
j¼1
PðMj yÞEðβj jMjÞ (10)
VarðβjyÞ ¼
X2q
j¼1
PðMj yÞVarðβj jy;MjÞ þ
X2q
j¼1
PðMj yÞ½Eðβj jy;MjÞ $ EðβjyÞ*
2
(11)
It is also possible to calculate PIP for the q regressors by adding the posterior model probabilities
including them. In fact, Steel (2017) considers these posterior inclusion and model probabilities as
virtues of the BMA methodology. It is worth noting that the estimation of the whole set of 2q
models can be avoided by excluding from (9) those that are much less likely than the best model.
This search strategy has been carried out through the leaps and bounds algorithm (Furnival and
Wilson 1974; Raftery 1995), which assumes a uniform distribution of model priors and uses a simple
Bayesian information criterion approximation – which corresponds fairly closely to the unit infor-
mation prior – to construct the prior probabilities of the regression coefficients.6
Socioeconomic Determinants of Terrorism
Main Results
Our empirical analysis begins with a preliminary estimation of the GLMs that deal with count data,
described in subsection 3.1. The first three columns of results in Table 2 report estimated
coefficients from a Poisson regression model fitted to the total number of attacks, domestic
incidents and transnational incidents, respectively. The economic variables with a significant and
positive relationship with the general measure of terrorism are real GDP per capita and growth.
Household final consumption expenditure, fuel exports, total population, population density and
military expenditure also have positive and statistically significant estimated coefficients. On the
contrary, net FDI inflows, transfers from abroad, the rate of participation of women in the labor
force and development assistance and aid have a negative relationship with terrorist attacks.
The lower panel of Table 2 reflects that a Poisson model sets the dispersion parameter to one
and, hence, that the variance of the endogenous variable is equal to the mean. This assumption
makes this model unsuitable for drawing inferences with over-dispersed count data. The results
from fitting a quasi-Poisson model – which estimates the shape parameter from the data – are
reported in the next three columns. The shape parameters are much greater than one in the three
categories of incidents. Although the coefficients are equal to those estimated using a Poisson
model, this is not the case of the standard errors. This implies that only household consumption
expenditure, exports of fuel, population and military expenditure (transfers from abroad and
female labor force participation) have a significant positive (negative) influence on terrorist attacks.
As shown in the last three columns, these findings are corroborated by the negative binomial
regression model, which assumes a quadratic relationship between the mean and the variance,
determined by the shape parameter. These estimations also suggest that the unemployment rate
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Table 2. Preliminary estimation results: Generalized linear models.
Poisson Quasi-Poisson Negative binomial
All attacks Domestic Transnational All attacks Domestic Transnational All attacks Domestic Transnational
lngdppc 0.429*** 0.487*** 0.273*** 0.429*** 0.487* 0.273 0.164 −0.190 0.601**
(0.016) (0.030) (0.047) (0.166) (0.265) (0.213) (0.194) (0.376) (0.251)
Growth 0.024*** 0.033*** 0.021*** 0.024** 0.033 0.021** 0.002 0.061* 0.028
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.010) (0.020) (0.010) (0.015) (0.034) (0.019)
Unempl −0.003** 0.073*** 0.018*** −0.003 0.073*** 0.018 0.043*** 0.115*** 0.046***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.014) (0.019) (0.014) (0.011) (0.021) (0.015)
Inflation 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000 0.001*** 0.001** 0.000 0.002 0.004* 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Consumhh 0.038*** 0.031*** 0.044*** 0.038*** 0.031** 0.044*** 0.024** 0.046*** 0.026**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.009) (0.013) (0.011) (0.009) (0.017) (0.011)
gfcf −0.058*** 0.012*** −0.076*** −0.058*** 0.012 −0.076*** −0.069*** −0.080*** −0.040***
(0.001) (0.003) (0.004) (0.014) (0.022) (0.018) (0.013) (0.028) (0.015)
Govexp 0.008*** −0.132*** 0.044*** 0.008 −0.132*** 0.044* −0.031* −0.031 −0.004
(0.002) (0.004) (0.005) (0.020) (0.034) (0.024) (0.018) (0.036) (0.023)
Openness 0.011*** −0.007*** −0.006*** 0.011*** −0.007 −0.006 0.006*** −0.000 −0.009***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.006) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003)
Primaryx 0.016*** 0.012*** −0.001 0.016*** 0.012* −0.001 0.008** 0.020*** 0.009*
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.007) (0.006) (0.004) (0.007) (0.005)
Fuelx 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.008*** 0.008** 0.009*** 0.011*** 0.020*** 0.008*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.004)
fdi −0.047*** −0.056*** −0.026*** −0.047* −0.056 −0.026 0.008 −0.007 −0.006
(0.002) (0.005) (0.005) (0.025) (0.047) (0.025) (0.014) (0.027) (0.019)
Transfers −5.202*** −4.099*** −3.479*** −5.202*** −4.099** −3.479** −4.433*** −3.253 −5.306***
(0.157) (0.214) (0.366) (1.593) (1.860) (1.675) (1.315) (2.302) (1.441)
Aid −10.258*** −7.444*** −0.828 −10.258*** −7.444* −0.828 −3.042 −6.275 −0.130
(0.312) (0.514) (0.682) (3.174) (4.467) (3.122) (1.971) (4.248) (2.300)
Lnpopul 0.852*** 0.672*** 0.487*** 0.852*** 0.672*** 0.487*** 1.125*** 1.631*** 0.740***
(0.007) (0.013) (0.018) (0.067) (0.114) (0.081) (0.062) (0.158) (0.083)
Popdens 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.001 0.000 0.002*** 0.000 0.001 0.002**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Urban −0.017*** 0.002 −0.000 −0.017*** 0.002 −0.000 −0.032*** −0.033*** −0.016**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.006) (0.011) (0.007) (0.006) (0.012) (0.008)
Lifexp 0.017*** −0.061*** 0.014*** 0.017 −0.061*** 0.014 0.095*** 0.162*** 0.027
(0.001) (0.002) (0.005) (0.015) (0.019) (0.021) (0.017) (0.032) (0.023)
Female −0.035*** −0.036*** −0.037*** −0.035*** −0.036*** −0.037*** −0.011** −0.017 −0.019***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.005) (0.008) (0.007) (0.005) (0.011) (0.007)
Primary 0.025*** 0.059*** −0.000 0.025*** 0.059*** −0.000 −0.001 −0.002 −0.004
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.006) (0.008) (0.007) (0.005) (0.011) (0.007)
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Table 2. (Continued).
Poisson Quasi-Poisson Negative binomial
All attacks Domestic Transnational All attacks Domestic Transnational All attacks Domestic Transnational
Secondary −0.016*** −0.015*** 0.006*** −0.016*** −0.015** 0.006 −0.013*** −0.034*** −0.010*
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.008) (0.006) (0.004) (0.009) (0.005)
Armedf 0.066*** −0.023* −0.117*** 0.066 −0.023* −0.117 0.141* 0.057 0.041
(0.006) (0.012) (0.016) (0.065) (0.105) (0.073) (0.077) (0.160) (0.098)
Milexp 0.237*** 0.403*** 0.332*** 0.237*** 0.403*** 0.332*** 0.478*** 0.858*** 0.380***
(0.005) (0.009) (0.011) (0.050) (0.077) (0.050) (0.076) (0.154) (0.090)
Constant −18.584*** −15.420*** −12.094*** −18.584*** −15.420*** −12.094*** −23.070*** −35.784*** −18.361***
(0.223) (0.448) (0.567) (2.263) (3.897) (2.595) (2.581) (5.509) (3.171)
ϕ 1 1 1 103.373 75.488 20.950 1 1 1
θ 4.348 9.656 5.941
Pseudo R2 0.577 0.524 0.468 0.577 0.524 0.468 0.082 0.100 0.082
Log likelihood −43,199.694 −17,897.138 −7,546.236 −43,199.694 −17,897.138 −7,546.236 −4,322.774 −2,120.974 −2,340.015
Note: The number of observations is 1,644. Standard errors in parentheses. ϕ and θ denote the dispersion and shape parameters, respectively. p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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and exports of primary goods are positively related to terrorist attacks, while the converse is true
for gross fixed capital formation, urban population and secondary schooling.
More in line with the main aim of this study, Table 3 shows the results obtained from
applying the BMA approach in a quasi-Poisson regression framework. The first three columns
report, for each variable, the PIP (in percentage terms) and the mean and standard deviation of
estimated coefficients when all types of attacks are jointly considered. These latter figures can
be interpreted, respectively, as a BMA point estimation and standard error. It can be observed
that household consumption, gross fixed capital formation, openness, transfers from abroad,
population, female labor market participation, school enrollment rates and military expendi-
ture are included in the seven models selected. The sign of the mean coefficients coincides
with that obtained using a GLM regression. The high inclusion probabilities of population,
female labor force participation, primary schooling and military expenditure do not change
when we focus on domestic incidents. In this case, unemployment has a robust positive
relationship with the number of attacks. Government expenditure and life expectancy are
regressors with high PIPs and a negative influence on terrorism. Population density also
displays a high inclusion probability when transnational incidents are considered. The number
of models selected is much higher than in the two previous analyses. As a consequence, the
posterior probability of the best model and the cumulative posterior probability of the best
five models are lower.
As pointed out by Mueller (2016), it may be troublesome to work with absolute counts referring
to countries with very different sizes. For this reason, the same BMA analysis presented before has
Table 3. Bayesian model averaging: Quasi-Poisson regression, absolute values.
All attacks Domestic Transnational
PIP Mean SD PIP Mean SD PIP Mean SD
lngdppc 13.6 0.036 0.108 11.5 0.036 0.110 67.5 0.338 0.251
Growth 0 0.000 0.000 0 0.000 0.000 1.8 0.000 0.002
Unempl 0 0.000 0.000 100 0.071 0.016 27.3 0.009 0.016
Inflation 0 0.000 0.000 2.9 0.000 0.000 0 0.000 0.000
Consumhh 100 0.031 0.007 9.2 0.001 0.006 70.9 0.021 0.017
gfcf 100 −0.060 0.010 22.3 −0.009 0.018 100 −0.011 0.025
Govexp 3.1 −0.001 0.004 100 −0.182 0.029 21.1 0.011 0.023
Openness 100 0.010 0.002 74.8 −0.011 0.001 7.6 −0.000 0.002
Primaryx 0 0.000 0.000 0 0.000 0.000 0 0.000 0.000
Fuelx 9.1 0.000 0.001 1.7 0.000 0.001 74.1 0.007 0.005
fdi 11.5 −0.005 0.017 0 0.000 0.000 1.9 −0.001 0.005
Transfers 100 −6.086 1.450 70.3 −3.009 2.402 37.2 1.539 2.242
Aid 7.7 −0.304 1.230 0 0.000 0.000 0 0.000 0.000
Lnpopul 100 0.827 0.047 100 0.583 0.110 100 0.574 0.061
Popdens 0 0.000 0.000 1.6 −0.000 0.000 97.6 0.002 0.000
Urban 4.6 −0.001 0.003 17.2 0.003 0.006 0 0.000 0.000
Lifexp 0 0.000 0.000 96.5 −0.062 0.022 34.1 0.019 0.028
Female 100 −0.045 0.004 100 −0.038 0.007 100 −0.035 0.005
Primary 100 0.026 0.005 100 0.052 0.007 0 0.000 0.000
Secondary 100 −0.011 0.003 0 0.000 0.000 0 0.000 0.000
Armedf 0 0.000 0.000 0 0.000 0.000 3.5 −0.004 0.025
Milexp 100 0.228 0.037 100 0.400 0.067 100 0.291 0.025
Constant 100 −13.041 1.589 100 −6.339 3.150 100 −11.954 2.561
Models 7 21 44
BIC1 −11,256.14 −11,620.53 −11,438.87
PP1 0.550 0.301 0.099
CPP5 0.923 0.558 0.377
Note: PIP denotes the posterior inclusion probability of each variable. Mean and SD are the posterior mean and standard
deviation of each coefficient from model averaging, respectively. The lower panel reports the number of models selected, the
values of the Schwarz information criterion (BIC1), the posterior probability (PP1) of the best model and the cumulative
posterior probability of the five best models (CPP5).
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been applied to terrorist attacks expressed in relative terms with respect to population. The
corresponding results are reported in Table 4. Similarly to Jetter and Stadelmann (2017), previous
results change substantially once the focus is put on the number of terrorist attacks per capita.
There are meaningful and relevant changes in terms of sign, magnitude and inclusion probabilities
for several potential determinants of terrorism. As expected, population presents much lower PIPs
than those obtained in the BMA exercise with attacks in absolute terms. The number of variables
that, for each specification, are included in all selected models also tends to be lower. It is worth
noting that there is no clear robust determinant of domestic terrorism when attacks are expressed
per inhabitant. Further, controlling for country population does not alter the high PIPs attributed to
female labor force participation and military expenditure and reveals the relevance of gross fixed
capital formation, unemployment and secondary schooling.
A visual summary of the results described above is shown in Figure 1. Each graph ranks,
vertically, the potential determinants of terrorism according to their PIPs. Likewise, selected models
are ordered, horizontally, taking into account their posterior probability, which is proportional to
the column width. A colored rectangle reflects that the variable is included in the model and
indicates the sign of its estimated influence (red when positive, blue when negative). The number
of models selected depends on whether terror is expressed in absolute or in relative terms. Due to
the lower number of models chosen and the resulting higher PIPs, it seems more appropriate to
use absolute values to draw conclusions about the robust determinants of domestic terrorism. This
may be reflecting that national socioeconomic conditions are more important in this context. For
each specification, military expenditure is consistently included in all selected models. Other
Table 4. Bayesian model averaging: Quasi-Poisson regression, in per capita terms.
All attacks Domestic Transnational
PIP Mean SD PIP Mean SD PIP Mean SD
lngdppc 2.6 0.010 0.066 0.9 −0.003 0.036 2.5 0.007 0.058
Growth 19.1 0.004 0.009 0 0.000 0.000 0 0.000 0.000
Unempl 100 0.046 0.011 1.4 0.001 0.008 100 0.051 0.013
Inflation 1.3 0.000 0.000 0 0.000 0.000 0 0.000 0.000
Consumhh 59.7 0.018 0.016 11.7 0.006 0.018 5.9 0.001 0.005
gfcf 100 −0.090 0.021 24.4 −0.031 0.060 100 −0.139 0.017
Govexp 47.4 −0.024 0.029 15.2 −0.025 0.068 2.7 −0.001 0.005
Openness 0 0.000 0.000 9.1 −0.002 0.007 2.8 −0.000 0.001
Primaryx 25.5 0.002 0.004 0 0.000 0.000 0 0.000 0.000
Fuelx 0 0.000 0.000 0 0.000 0.000 0 0.000 0.000
fdi 0 0.000 0.000 5.1 −0.010 0.051 0 0.000 0.000
Transfers 56.3 −2.498 2.425 0 0.000 0.000 30.2 −1.083 1.854
Aid 0.9 0.022 0.261 0 0.000 0.000 0 0.000 0.000
lnpopul 0.7 −0.001 0.008 0 0.000 0.000 23.1 −0.038 0.078
Popdens 62.9 0.001 0.001 0 0.000 0.000 100 −0.002 0.000
Urban 0 0.000 0.000 0 0.000 0.000 7.5 0.001 0.004
Lifexp 100 0.107 0.019 0 0.000 0.000 100 0.125 0.029
Female 100 −0.022 0.005 29.9 −0.013 0.022 100 −0.029 0.006
Primary 25.4 0.003 0.006 0 0.000 0.000 0 0.000 0.000
Secondary 100 −0.027 0.006 5.7 −0.011 0.005 94.7 −0.020 0.008
Armedf 0 0.000 0.000 3.2 0.008 0.048 0 0.000 0.000
Milexp 100 0.281 0.033 12.5 0.044 0.130 100 0.339 0.026
Constant 100 −19.308 1.870 100 −13.955 2.210 100 −20.182 2.307
Models 34 26 10
BIC1 −11,444.20 −12,084.59 −11,653.29
PP1 0.124 0.178 0.408
CPP5 0.504 0.540 0.807
Note: PIP denotes the posterior inclusion probability of each variable. Mean and SD are the posterior mean and standard
deviation of each coefficient from model averaging, respectively. The lower panel reports the number of models selected, the
values of the Schwarz information criterion (BIC1), the posterior probability (PP1) of the best model and the cumulative
posterior probability of the five best models (CPP5).
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Figure 1. Selected models: Quasi-Poisson regression. Colored areas reflect the inclusion of variables in the model and whether
their estimated coefficients are positive (red) or negative (blue).
DEFENCE AND PEACE ECONOMICS 11
Figure 2. Selected models: Negative binomial regression. Colored areas reflect the inclusion of variables in the model and
whether their estimated coefficients are positive (red) or negative (blue).
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variables that display high PIPs are gross fixed capital formation, unemployment, female labor force
participation and secondary schooling.
Robustness Checks
As a robustness check of previous findings, Figure 2 shows the selected models and the corre-
sponding variables they include, together with the sign of their estimated influence on terrorism,
when the BMA is implemented within a negative binomial regression framework. Before describing
these results, it should be acknowledged that the computational methods available do not permit
the estimation of the shape parameter. For this reason, the values obtained in the preliminary
analysis, reported in the lower panel of Table 2, have been used to fit this regression model. The
main difference with respect to previous results is that, with the exception of the general measure
of terrorism, the number of models chosen is lower when the number of incidents is considered in
absolute terms. Again, this specification is found to be more suitable to establish a robust relation-
ship between the socioeconomic determinants of terrorism and domestic incidents. These results
corroborate the conclusions drawn about the variables with a robust relationship with terrorism as
well as their sign. Therefore, it can be stated that our findings are not determined by the GLM
applied.
Up to now, neither the cross-sectional nor the temporal dimensions of the data have been taken
into account. Time fixed effects (FEs) may be useful to control for common shocks, the cyclical
behavior of terrorism and changes in data encoding procedures. Country and regional dummies
will allow us to proxy for the possible presence of unobserved heterogeneity at these levels.
Table 5 reports, for the quasi-Poisson regression framework, the inclusion probabilities obtained
when time, country and regional FEs are introduced into the estimations. The use of country
dummies leads to the selection of a small number of high-dimensional models. This finding
corroborates the concerns about country FEs raised by, among others, Freytag et al. (2011) and
Rockey and Temple (2016). Following their suggestion, we will focus on the results obtained when
time and/or regional dummies are included in the estimations.
The introduction of time and regional FEs does not alter the main overall conclusions drawn
about the regressors with a more robust relationship with terrorism. When the number of incidents
is considered in absolute values, regional dummies increase the inclusion probabilities of GDP per
capita, fuel exports, household consumption and urban population in the specifications for the
broad measure of terrorism and transnational attacks. In the latter case, regional FEs also lead to
higher (lower) inclusion probabilities for transfers from abroad and armed forces personnel
(unemployment). These findings are in line with the widely-held belief that transnational terrorism
is more likely to be driven by international factors than by national socioeconomic conditions. Time
and regional dummies increase the PIPs of unemployment and female labor force participation
rates when domestic incidents are considered in terms per capita.
As pointed out in Section 2, the composition of the sample analyzed in the present study has
been determined by the availability of data of some variables, which may be inducing sample
selection biases. In addition, results from BMA can be affected by measurement errors and outliers,
two issues present in terrorism data. For these reasons, a sensitivity analysis similar to that in
Ciccone and Jarocinski (2010) and Moral-Benito (2012) has been implemented. The PIPs obtained
for each variable when individual countries are dropped from the sample one by one have been
compared to that obtained using all observations by calculating the absolute value of their
difference. Therefore, lower figures reflect a smaller sensitivity of the results to changes in the
composition of the sample. The second and third columns of Table 6 report, respectively and for
different specifications, average and median values of the absolute differences in PIPs for all
variables. Regardless of the type of incidents and their consideration in absolute or relative
terms, the average and, especially, the median of the differences are close to zero. These results
allow us to state that the conclusions drawn about the socioeconomic variables that display a
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Table 5. Robustness check: Time, country and regional fixed effects.
Absolute values
All attacks Domestic Transnational
lngdppc 0 0 100 100 100 2.2 100 0 100 0 58.2 100 13.7 3.8 0
Growth 91.3 0 0 0 18.7 4.7 21.2 0 100 0 7.3 12.1 100 0 96.8
Unempl 0 0 73.3 100 100 100 94.5 0 100 100 11.2 4.7 3.4 14.0 5.0
Inflation 19.7 12.9 0 100 0 3.9 100 0 100 0 0 100 0 100 0
Consumhh 14.6 21.8 100 100 100 7.6 0 3.6 0 4.0 100 53.7 100 100 100
gfcf 100 78.2 61.7 100 100 79.5 0 5.2 0 5.2 100 46.3 66.9 100 100
Govexp 71.1 0 0 0 0 100 94.5 14.5 0 16.1 100 24.2 3.0 0 4.7
Openness 100 0 100 0 100 19.8 100 2.8 100 13.3 0 100 100 0 12.4
Primaryx 0 100 100 100 41.1 0 100 0 100 0 0 100 0 0 0
Fuelx 0 21.4 100 4.0 100 0 100 5.6 100 87.7 100 100 95.7 3.8 100
fdi 0 0 74.0 0 0 0 72.8 0 100 0 0 9.8 55.3 84.6 10.2
Transfers 95.6 0 92.6 100 100 58.8 0 0 4.2 3.0 97.6 5.9 58.2 100 71.7
Aid 46.6 0 0 100 0 0 15.9 0 9.7 0 0 93.5 0 100 0
lnpopul 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Popdens 0 100 0 100 0 0 100 0 100 0 100 100 6.7 100 0
Urban 5.6 100 19.0 100 39.7 97.8 100 0 100 0 0 100 100 100 100
Lifexp 12.6 100 2.3 100 98.3 100 100 6.0 100 100 46.0 100 42.8 96.2 100
Female 100 92.2 100 100 100 100 100 82.8 100 100 100 100 47.5 100 34.6
Primary 100 0 100 100 100 100 100 3.0 4.6 100 0 100 0 27.8 6.2
Secondary 76.2 0 100 0 95.9 0 0 3.3 0 0 0 94.4 1.6 100 10.0
Armedf 47.9 0 19.8 11.1 100 0 20.1 0 100 71.3 0 100 100 100 100
Milexp 100 0 100 6.0 100 100 79.9 2.9 0 16.0 100 100 100 100 100
Time FEs Yes No No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Country FEs No Yes No Yes No No Yes No Yes No No Yes No Yes No
Regional FEs No No Yes No Yes No No Yes No Yes No No Yes No Yes
Models 34 5 20 4 10 13 8 13 4 12 8 12 36 6 21
CCP5 0.4 1 0.6 1 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.7 1 0.8 0.9 0.7 0.4 1 0.6
Per capita terms
All attacks Domestic Transnational
lngdppc 2.6 100 100 100 91.2 4.5 9.5 0 100 0 15.0 100 13.6 100 6.5
Growth 80.2 4.8 9.3 0 77.3 0 90.5 0.7 4.6 2.8 5.9 100 1.5 0 3.2
Unempl 100 0 100 0 100 100 86.4 100 100 100 100 53.6 88.6 100 100
Inflation 0 100 0 100 0 0 100 0 100 0 0 100 0 100 0
Consumhh 100 100 100 100 100 100 25.0 0 14.5 18.1 78.6 2.0 38.2 0 96.4
gfcf 100 100 100 100 100 17.9 75.0 3.3 92.6 16.0 100 100 100 100 100
Govexp 14.1 0 0 0 1.6 50.1 100 26.2 92.6 6.1 1.2 76.2 40.3 6.6 3.6
Openness 0 0 0 15.9 0 100 13.6 40.0 7.4 100 1.1 80.5 4.1 0 0
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Table 5. (Continued).
Per capita terms
All attacks Domestic Transnational
Primaryx 0 100 33.1 100 28.6 15.7 100 0.5 100 0 1.0 100 2.8 100 0
Fuelx 41.8 100 22.1 100 47.0 32.2 100 0 100 4.4 74.6 100 0 100 86.7
fdi 1.0 0 0 89.3 0 0 100 25.4 100 0 0 0 0 0 0
Transfers 83.8 0 100 100 92.9 0 0 0 100 0 39.4 0 51.7 100 73.2
Aid 0 100 0 100 0 0 100 0 100 0 0 74.3 0 100 0
lnpopul 0 100 0 100 1.0 0 100 0 100 0 18.6 100 0 100 0
Popdens 65.3 100 100 100 100 15.2 100 43.8 100 100 100 100 79.5 0 94.7
Urban 0 100 0 100 0 3.8 100 0 100 2.1 6.3 100 0 100 0
Lifexp 100 100 0 100 0 0 100 78.4 100 100 100 4.1 89.6 100 100
Female 100 100 10.2 100 28.8 100 100 47.6 100 100 100 100 11.6 100 0
Primary 68.0 0 6.0 0 56.7 100 100 3.8 100 100 0 0 0 5.9 0
Secondary 100 0 100 100 100 93.4 100 28.5 100 16.0 84.9 100 100 0 100
Armedf 0 0 0 0 0.8 0 0 27.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 8.8
Milexp 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 73.5 100 100 100 100 100 4.5 100
Time FEs Yes No No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Country FEs No Yes No Yes No No Yes No Yes No No Yes No Yes No
Regional FEs No No Yes No Yes No No Yes No Yes No No Yes No Yes
Models 29 2 9 3 23 15 5 57 4 9 30 8 24 4 10
CCP5 0.5 1 0.9 1 0.5 0.7 1 0.3 1 0.9 0.51 0.9 0.6 1 0.8
Note: This table reports the posterior inclusion probabilities of a given variable under different specifications in a quasi-Poisson regression framework. Regional fixed effects have been defined
according to the World Bank’s list of economies (as of June 2018, see Appendix A). The lower panel reports the number of models selected and the cumulative posterior probability of the best
five models.
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robust relationship with terrorism are not determined by the countries included in the sample or
by outlying observations.
The last two columns of Table 6 show average and median absolute differences between
inclusion probabilities, obtained when geographical regions are subsequently removed from the
sample. As expected, these differences are greater than those calculated in the previous
sensitivity analysis based on individual countries, particularly when attacks are not expressed
in relative terms. This finding suggests that a heterogeneous relationship may exist between
terrorism and its determinants at the geographical level. To further explore this possibility, in
the estimations, we have included the interaction of regional dummies with the variables for
which a robust relationship with terrorism has been established. In doing so, and trying to take
into account the concerns regarding the use of interaction terms in BMA within a growth
regression framework (Crespo 2011; Papageorgiou 2011), the specification for all attacks per
capita has been used.
The results for the interaction terms are reported7 in Table 7. These figures show that there is no
particular relationship between the selected variables and the general measure of terrorism per
capita in Europe and Central Asia and in the Middle East and North Africa regions. However, the
Table 6. Sensitivity analysis: Sample composition.
Countries Regions
Average Median Average Median
Absolute values
All attacks 1.499 0.000 21.264 3.100
Domestic 1.904 0.000 21.727 5.850
Transnational 2.420 0.100 16.718 2.600
Per capita terms
All attacks 2.142 0.000 14.256 1.450
Domestic 1.693 0.000 11.989 0.900
Transnational 1.228 0.000 11.188 1.550
Note: This table reports average and median absolute values of the difference between posterior inclusion probabilities for all
variables when individual countries or regions are dropped consecutively from the sample.
Table 7. Regional heterogeneity: Interaction terms.
East Asia & Pacific Europe & Central Asia Latin America & Caribbean
PIP Mean SD PIP Mean SD PIP Mean SD
Unempl 100 −0.626 0.224 1.9 0.001 0.005 0 0.000 0.000
gfcf 1.0 0.001 0.009 1.5 0.000 0.002 0.8 0.000 0.004
Female 39.8 0.016 0.021 0 0.000 0.000 44.1 −0.003 0.006
Secondary 30.9 0.011 0.017 0 0.000 0.000 100 −0.037 0.006
Milexp 0.5 −0.004 0.066 0 0.000 0.000 100 1.117 0.148
Models 60 39 52
CCP5 0.344 0.488 0.341
Middle East & North Africa South Asia Sub-Saharan Africa
PIP Mean SD PIP Mean SD PIP Mean SD
Unempl 0 0.000 0.000 0 0.000 0.000 1.0 −0.000 0.004
gfcf 0.8 −0.000 0.005 100 −0.227 0.064 0 0.000 0.000
Female 3.8 0.001 0.006 78.8 0.043 0.026 87.5 −0.033 0.014
Secondary 0 0.000 0.000 89.9 0.055 0.024 0 0.000 0.000
Milexp 0 0.000 0.000 0 0.000 0.000 47.0 −0.092 0.119
Models 37 38 24
CCP5 0.492 0.465 0.548
Note: This table reports the results for interaction terms between regional dummies and selected variables. All types of attacks
in per capita terms have been considered. PIP denotes the posterior inclusion probability of each variable. Mean and SD are
the posterior mean and standard deviation of each coefficient from model averaging, respectively. Lower panels report the
number of models selected and the cumulative posterior probability of the five best models.
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influence of unemployment on terrorism seems to be smaller in the countries located in East Asia
and the Pacific. Gross fixed capital formation plays an important role in attenuating terrorism in
South Asia, where its relationship with secondary schooling becomes positive. On the contrary, the
mitigating role of human capital is relevant in Latin America and the Caribbean. In this region, the
mean coefficient of military expenditure is greater than in the others. Finally, it is worth noting that
the only evidence of a weak relationship between military spending and terrorism is found in Sub-
Saharan African countries.
Concluding Remarks
This paper contributes to the empirical literature on the socioeconomic determinants of terrorism
at country level by introducing model uncertainty. With this aim, a BMA approach has been
implemented within a generalized linear regression model framework. In this way, we have been
able to take into account the over-dispersed count data nature of terrorist incidents. Together with
the traditional distinction between domestic and international attacks, a general measure of
terrorism has also been considered. Furthermore, terrorist incidents have also been expressed in
per capita terms to control for country size.
When incidents are introduced in absolute values, the variables with a clear robust relationship with
terrorism are female labor force participation, military expenditure and total population.
Understandably, the PIP of population tends to zero when terrorist attacks are expressed per inhabi-
tant. The use of a relativemeasure of terror also allows us to uncover the influence of gross fixed capital
formation and the rates of secondary school enrollment and unemployment. These results do not
depend on the generalized linear regression model applied, are robust to the inclusion of time and
regional FEs, and do not seem to be determined by the countries included in the sample or by outliers.
It is worth noting that we are not establishing any causal relationship due to potential
endogeneity concerns between terrorism and its determinants (Coggins 2015; Jetter and
Stadelmann 2017). Although all explanatory variables have been included lagged one year trying
to mitigate the possible presence of reverse causation, this might not be a completely satisfactory
solution if terror persists over time. The reason is that past levels of terrorist activity might have
also affected lagged socioeconomic variables (Kis-Katos, Liebert, and Schulze 2011). Indeed, the
robust positive relationship between military expenditure and terror may be a consequence of
their joint determination because terrorism is expected to be associated with other forms of
political violence, conflicts and wars (Gassebner and Luechinger 2011).
Having said that, it can be observed that the regressors with high inclusion probabilities display
estimated mean coefficients with the correct sign. More importantly, these variables reflect labor
market conditions (unemployment and female labor force participation) and economic prospects
(gross fixed capital formation and secondary schooling). This implies that a suitable strategy against
terrorism may consist of improving economic conditions to reduce frustration and make violence
less attractive to both perpetrators and their supporters (Freytag et al. 2011; Krieger and Meierrieks
2011). Hence, policies should be aimed at increasing the opportunity costs of terrorism by making
labor markets efficient and inclusive and supporting education and entrepreneurship (see Okafor
and Piesse (2017) for similar recommendations).
In contrast to previous studies, our results suggest that the roots of domestic and transnational
terrorism are different. Nonetheless, it is difficult to find robust determinants of the number of domestic
incidents using relative values. This implies that adopting a country-level perspective seems to bemore
appropriate to analyze transnational terrorism. In addition, we have provided some tentative evidence
of a geographically heterogeneous relationship between terrorism and its determinants. Therefore, a
promising research avenue would be to embrace a subnational standpoint (Abadie and Javier 2003)
and explore within-country drivers of terrorism. By proceeding in this way, the over-dispersed nature of
the data will be mitigated, increasing the ability to control for other relevant issues in the present
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context such as the severity of the attacks (Gassebner and Luechinger 2011), spatial dependence
(Crespo Cuaresma and Feldkircher 2013; Sandler 2014) or reverse causality (Moral-Benito 2016).
Notes
1. A recent empirical study of the determinants of terrorism in fragile states can be found in Okafor and Piesse
(2017).
2. A literature review on model averaging, with an emphasis on its application to economic issues, can be found
in Moral-Benito (2015) and Steel (2017).
3. Retrieved from http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd.
4. GDP per capita and total population have been introduced in natural logarithms to control for skewness.
5. As an example, the case of θ ¼ 1 corresponds to the geometric model, which implies a quadratic relationship
between the mean and the variance.
6. The methods described in this section have been implemented using the BMA R package (The R Core Team
2018; Raftery et al. 2017). Other available packages to perform BMA have been developed by Zeugner and
Feldkircher (2015) and Clyde (2018). A comparison of their performance can be found in Amini and Parmeter
(2011) and Forte, Garcia-Donato, and Steel (2018).
7. The North-American region has not been displayed as it only includes two countries: Canada and the United
States. Inclusion probabilities for the interaction terms using this regional dummy tend to zero. Unreported
results, available from the authors upon request.
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Appendix A. List of countries
The countries that have been included in the empirical analysis carried out in the present study are Albania [ECA] (18),
Algeria [MENA] (14), Angola [SSA] (3), Argentina [LAC] (20), Armenia [ECA] (9), Australia [EAP] (21), Austria [ECA] (23),
Azerbaijan [ECA] (2), Bangladesh [SOA] (8), Belarus [ECA] (7), Belgium [ECA] (12), Belize [LAC] (14), Benin [SSA] (8),
Bolivia [LAC] (16), Botswana [SSA] (9), Brazil [LAC] (12), Bulgaria [ECA] (9), Burkina Faso [SSA] (15), Burundi [SSA] (8),
Cabo Verde [SSA] (7), Cambodia [EAP] (7), Cameroon [SSA] (17), Canada [NOA] (19), Central African Republic [SSA] (1),
Chile [LAC] (19), China [EAP] (18), Colombia [LAC] (23), Republic of the Congo [SSA] (1), Croatia [ECA] (16), Czech
Republic [ECA] (12), Denmark [ECA] (23), Djibouti [MENA] (1), Dominican Republic [LAC] (15), Ecuador [LAC] (19), Egypt
[MENA] (18), El Salvador [LAC] (19), Eritrea [SSA] (3), Estonia [ECA] (5), Ethiopia [SSA] (2), Fiji [EAP] (11), Finland [ECA]
(23), France [ECA] (23), Gabon [SSA] (3), Gambia [SSA] (4), Georgia [ECA] (14), Germany [ECA] (21), Ghana [SSA] (15),
Greece [ECA] (16), Guatemala [LAC] (22), Guinea [SSA] (6), Guyana [LAC] (13), Honduras [LAC] (10), Hungary [ECA] (10),
Iceland [ECA] (4), India [SOA] (18), Indonesia [EAP] (4), Iran [MENA] (10), Iraq [MENA] (1), Ireland [ECA] (19), Israel
[MENA] (11), Italy [ECA] (23), Jamaica [LAC] (7), Japan [EAP] (23), Jordan [MENA] (16), Kazakhstan [ECA] (9), Kenya [SSA]
(11), South Korea [EAP] (9), Kyrgyzstan [ECA] (17), Latvia [ECA] (9), Lebanon [MENA] (14), Lesotho [SSA] (5), Lithuania
[ECA] (1), Luxembourg [ECA] (1), Republic of Macedonia [ECA] (18), Madagascar [SSA] (9), Malawi [SSA] (21), Malaysia
[EAP] (23), Mali [SSA] (15), Mauritania [SSA] (7), Mauritius [SSA] (12), Mexico [LAC] (22), Moldova [ECA] (16), Mongolia
[EAP] (11), Morocco [MENA] (22), Mozambique [SSA] (17), Namibia [SSA] (8), Nepal [SOA] (7), Netherlands [ECA] (23),
New Zealand [EAP] (16), Nicaragua [LAC] (6), Nigeria [SSA] (12), Norway [ECA] (19), Oman [MENA] (1), Pakistan [SOA]
(13), Panama [LAC] (6), Papua New Guinea [EAP] (4), Paraguay [LAC] (18), Peru [LAC] (22), Philippines [EAP] (12), Poland
[ECA] (9), Portugal [ECA] (23), Romania [ECA] (13), Russia [ECA] (6), Rwanda [SSA] (15), Senegal [SSA] (17), Serbia [ECA]
(8), Slovak Republic [ECA] (10), Slovenia [ECA] (9), South Africa [SSA] (16), Spain [ECA] (23), Sri Lanka [SOA] (8), Sudan
[SSA] (8), Sweden [ECA] (23), Switzerland [ECA] (23), Tajikistan [ECA] (1), Tanzania [SSA] (4), Thailand [EAP] (21), Timor-
Leste [EAP] (1), Togo [SSA] (4), Trinidad and Tobago [LAC] (2), Tunisia [MENA] (21), Turkey [ECA] (23), Uganda [SSA] (6),
Ukraine [ECA] (15), United Kingdom [ECA] (15), United States [NOA] (22), Uruguay [LAC] (20), Venezuela [LAC] (18),
Yemen [MENA] (11), Zimbabwe [SSA] (13).
These countries have been grouped according to their geographic region following the World Bank’s list of
economies (as of June 2018) [EAP: East Asia & Pacific; ECA: Europe & Central Asia; LAC: Latin America & Caribbean;
MENA: Middle East & North Africa; NOA: North America; SOA: South Asia; SSA: Sub-Saharan Africa]. The number of
observations per country is reported in parentheses.
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